Autonomous weapons systems, killer robots and human dignity by Sharkey, A.J.
This is a repository copy of Autonomous weapons systems, killer robots and human 
dignity.




Sharkey, A.J. orcid.org/0000-0002-4713-2575 (2018) Autonomous weapons systems, killer





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Ethics and Information Technology 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9494-0
ORIGINAL PAPER
Autonomous weapons systems, killer robots and human dignity
Amanda Sharkey1 
 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
One of the several reasons given in calls for the prohibition of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) is that they are against 
human dignity (Asaro in Int Rev Red Cross 94(886):687–709, 2012; Docherty in Shaking the foundations: the human rights 
implications of killer robots, Human Rights Watch, New York, 2014; Heyns in S Afr J Hum Rights 33(1):46–71, 2017; Ulgen 
in Human dignity in an age of autonomous weapons: are we in danger of losing an ‘elementary consideration of human-
ity’? 2016). However there have been criticisms of the reliance on human dignity in arguments against AWS (Birnbacher 
in Autonomous weapons systems: law, ethics, policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016; Pop in Autonomous 
weapons systems: a threat to human dignity? 2018; Saxton in (Un)digniied killer robots? The problem with the human 
dignity argument, 2016). This paper critically examines the relationship between human dignity and AWS. Three main types 
of objection to AWS are identiied; (i) arguments based on technology and the ability of AWS to conform to international 
humanitarian law; (ii) deontological arguments based on the need for human judgement and meaningful human control, 
including arguments based on human dignity; (iii) consequentialist reasons about their efects on global stability and the 
likelihood of going to war. An account is provided of the claims made about human dignity and AWS, of the criticisms of 
these claims, and of the several meanings of ‘dignity’. It is concluded that although there are several ways in which AWS 
can be said to be against human dignity, they are not unique in this respect. There are other weapons, and other technologies, 
that also compromise human dignity. Given this, and the ambiguities inherent in the concept, it is wiser to draw on several 
types of objections in arguments against AWS, and not to rely exclusively on human dignity.
Keywords Autonomous weapons systems · Human dignity · Killer robots · International humanitarian law · Laws of war · 
Moral machines · Robot ethics
Robots and computers can be used to make decisions that 
afect humans in many spheres of life, from the trivially 
domestic (e.g. when to turn the heating on), to situations of 
life and death (e.g. autonomous car accidents). Autonomous 
weapons systems (AWS) represent an extreme example of 
such decision-making. These are weapon systems that can 
select and engage targets without human intervention. In 
other words, weapons systems that can make a decision to 
take human lives.
There has been considerable discussion and debate over 
deinitions of autonomy in weapons systems, but an over-
lap and agreement in deinitions is beginning to emerge. 
The US Department of Defence deines AWS as weapons 
that are able, ‘once activated, to select and engage targets 
without further intervention by a human operator’ (DOD 
directive 2012, updated 2017). The International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) deines them as ‘weapons that can 
independently select and attack targets, i.e. with autonomy 
in the ‘critical functions’ of acquiring, tracking, selecting 
and attacking targets’ (ICRC 2014). Recent deinitions often 
also incorporate the notion of meaningful human control: 
thus Human Rights Watch deines AWS as weapons which 
‘would identify and fire on targets without meaningful 
human control’ (HRW 2014; Amoroso et al. 2018).
Concerted eforts are currently being made to prohibit 
the development and use of AWS. The ‘campaign to stop 
killer robots’ was launched in 2013, and is formed of a 
global coalition of over 72 non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) from 31 countries. In 2015, an open letter 
was released, calling for ‘a ban on ofensive autonomous 
weapons beyond meaningful human control’, and signed by 
  Amanda Sharkey 
 a.sharkey@sheield.ac.uk




nearly 4000 Artiicial Intelligence and Robotics researchers, 
and over 22,000 others. There have been discussions at the 
United Nations of these weapon systems: the state parties to 
the Convention on Conventional Weapons have held annual 
meetings since 2014, and a Group of Governmental Experts 
was established at the UN in 2016 for further discussions, 
the most recent of which were held in November 2018. Fur-
ther discussions are being held in March 2019. In 2018, a 
call to ban these weapons was supported by 26 states.
There are many strong reasons to support a ban of AWS. 
These range from extreme diiculties in complying with 
international law to serious problems with global security. 
It has also been said that they are against human dignity 
(Asaro 2012; Docherty 2014; Heyns 2017; Ulgen 2016). 
However there have been criticisms of the use of human 
dignity as the basis for arguments for a prohibition of AWS 
(Pop 2018; Saxton 2016; Birnbacher 2016). There is also 
some uncertainty about the meaning of ‘dignity’ itself, and 
about its usefulness (e.g. Werner 2014). There is a need for 
greater clarity on this issue. The aim of this paper is to criti-
cally examine the relationship between human dignity and 
the arguments against AWS.
This paper begins by outlining the main arguments that 
have been made against autonomous weapons. Then we will 
look at the claims that these weapons are against human 
dignity, and their criticisms, framing these in the context 
of difering accounts of the meaning of human dignity. Fol-
lowing this, four questions about the relationship between 
human dignity and arguments against killer robots will be 
identiied and discussed.
Against autonomous weapons systems
A 2012 Human Rights Watch report provides an account 
of a comprehensive set of arguments against AWS (Human 
Rights Watch 2012). These arguments are based on the likely 
impact of AWS on the risks faced by civilians in war, and 
on their inability to conform to international humanitarian 
law (IHL), also known as the laws of armed conlict, or the 
laws of war. The laws of war relect the ‘exceptional circum-
stances that prevail during armed conlict’ (Heyns 2016, p. 
8) where there is a need to protect those not involved in the 
conlict. The principles of distinction, proportionality and 
military necessity are the crucial aspects of IHL intended to 
protect civilians. The 2012 report is clear that AWS are not 
able to realise these principles, since they require human 
judgement and human understanding. The report also points 
out that eliminating human involvement would remove the 
opportunity for compassion, which can provide a means for 
reducing the amount of civilian deaths. In addition, the use 
of AWS could make going to war more likely, since politi-
cians could instigate conlict without risking their nation’s 
human soldiers. Another tool for civilian protection iden-
tiied in the report is accountability. When autonomous 
weapons are used there is a lack of accountability, since the 
weapon or robot cannot be held responsible for its actions, 
and if unnecessary civilian deaths or casualties were to occur 
it is not clear who could be punished or held to account 
for them. Related arguments are made by several writers, 
including Sharkey (2012a, b), Asaro (2012), Tamburrini 
(2016) and Heyns (2013, 2016, 2017).
There are arguments that focus on the extent to which 
AWS can adhere to IHL and the laws of war, and arguments 
that focus more on whether they should be used, even if they 
were shown to be capable of doing so. In arguments that cor-
respond to the irst category, Sharkey (2012a, b) highlights 
the limited abilities of programmed computational systems 
and robots to conform to IHL. For example, the principle 
of distinction refers to the requirement that a weapons sys-
tem must allow the discrimination of combatants from non-
combatants or other immune actors. Sharkey (2012a, b) 
argues that AWS lack three necessary components for this. 
First, although they would be able to detect humans, their 
sensory and vision systems are not able to reliably tell com-
batants from non-combatants, or other immune actors such 
as wounded combatants, or those who have surrendered. 
Second, there is no existing codiied, or programmable, 
deinition of what constitutes a civilian (see also Sharkey 
2008). And third, autonomous robots and weapons lack the 
situational understanding and battleield awareness that is 
needed to satisfy the principle of distinction. For instance, a 
human could draw on an understanding of social situations 
to recognise insurgents burying their dead, or children being 
forced to carry riles, in a way that a robot could not.
The principles of proportionality and military neces-
sity are also beyond the capabilities of present and near 
future robots and weapons systems. Sharkey (2012a, b) 
distinguishes between what he calls the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
proportionality problems. The easy version involves cal-
culating the likely collateral damage of diferent forms of 
attack, and directing an attack so as to minimise such dam-
age. For instance, it is conceivable that robot software could 
choose the munitions to be used near a school in order to 
minimise the number of children killed. However, the hard 
version of proportionality is deciding whether the military 
advantage to be gained in such a situation would justify the 
use of any form of attack near a school. Decisions about 
military advantage and military necessity require ‘respon-
sible accountable human commanders, who can weigh the 
options based on experience and situational awareness’ 
(Sharkey 2012a, b). Suchman (2016) has also argued that 
machines cannot fulil the requirements of situational aware-
ness. Related arguments about the extent to which robots 
and computational devices could be programmed or trained 
to develop the necessary moral competence are reviewed in 
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Sharkey (2017). There are reasons to believe that not only 
do they not have situational understanding at present, but 
also that they are unlikely to have such understanding in the 
foreseeable future.
Heyns (2013) also points out the current inability of 
autonomous weapons to do proper targeting, and their 
“lack of human judgment, common sense, appreciation of 
the larger picture, understanding of the intentions behind 
people’s actions, and understanding of values and anticipa-
tion of the direction in which events are unfolding” (Heyns 
2013). However, as well as questioning whether autonomous 
weapons can do proper targeting, he also asks whether they 
should be used even if they were able to adhere to IHL rules 
about distinction, proportionality and precaution (Heyns 
2017).
Heyns’ argument is that even if autonomous weapons 
were able to match or exceed human ability to conform to 
IHL, they should still not be used without meaningful human 
control. According to him, their use would be an ofence 
against the right to life because (i) errors would still be made 
and there would be no person or persons to be held account-
able, and (ii) the lack of human deliberation would make 
targeting decisions arbitrary. He also argues that they would 
be against the right to dignity of those targeted and of those 
in whose name such force was deployed. Heyns (2017) bases 
his argument on the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights, which is emphatic about the need to protect a right 
to a ‘digniied life’, and which emphasises the interrelated 
nature of the right to life and the right to dignity. In other 
work (Heyns 2013, 2016), he places more emphasis on a 
Kantian account of dignity.
Asaro (2012) also argues that AWS should not be used 
even if they were able to meet the requirements of IHL. He 
argues that the IHL governing armed conlict, and the prin-
ciples of distinction, proportionality and military necessity, 
imply a requirement for human judgement, and a duty not 
to delegate the capability to initiate the use of lethal force to 
unsupervised machines or automated processes. His sugges-
tion is that IHL should be updated to include a prohibition 
of AWS, and the establishment of the principle that taking 
a human life requires an informed and considered human 
judgement.
Asaro’s contention is that IHL requires human judgement 
because the ‘rules’ that constitute it require interpretation, 
and are quite unlike the explicit rules of chess. For example, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross has developed 
guidelines to determine when a person should be considered 
to be a combatant. These guidelines specify three require-
ments that must be satisied before it can be concluded that 
a civilian is a legitimate target: (i) their actions must cross a 
threshold of harm, and adversely afect military operations; 
(ii) the harm must be directly caused by their actions and 
(iii) their actions must meet the requirement of belligerent 
nexus and be designed to directly cause the threshold of 
harm in support of one party to an armed conlict, to the 
detriment of another. Guidelines such as these cannot be 
easily translated into the kind of unambiguous rules that a 
robot or computer system can follow.
According to Asaro (2012) ‘the very nature of IHL …. 
presupposes that combatants will be human agents’ (p. 2). Its 
rules are supplemented by heuristic guidelines for humans 
to follow, and it requires combatants to consider the impli-
cations of their actions. He also argues that law in general 
requires human judgement: justice requires a human duty to 
‘consider the evidence, deliberate alternative interpretations 
and reach an informed opinion’. The structure of law and 
the processes of justice require the presence of a human as 
a legal agent, and the case against AWS is both a legal and 
a moral one.
Amoroso and Tamburrini (2017) distinguish two kinds of 
argument made about AWS: deontological and consequen-
tialist. They identify three main deontological arguments: 
(a) that AWS would be unable to conform to IHL and IHRL 
rules governing the use of lethal force; (b) that AWS would 
create an accountability gap; and (c) that deployment of 
AWS would be contrary to human dignity and the require-
ment that ‘the taking of human life should be reserved to 
human decision-makers’.
In terms of consequentialist arguments, Amoroso and 
Tamburrini contrast narrow and wide consequentialist rea-
sons. As Tamburrini (2016) points out, narrow consequen-
tialist advantages are sometimes claimed for the future use 
of AWS—including reductions of casualties due to more 
accurate targeting and freedom from human self-preserva-
tion concerns (Arkin 2009). However, Tamburrini identi-
ies a wide consequentialist view that takes into account the 
expected efects on peace stability, and on incentives to start 
wars. He argues that AWS are ‘potentially more threatening 
to global security than many other conventional weapons’ 
(Tamburrini 2016, p. 140). He agrees with Sharkey (2008) 
that their use could reduce the risks of a ‘body bag count’, 
and as a consequence, remove a major disincentive for 
war. Sharkey (2012a, b) also highlights concerns about an 
increase in the pace of war as a result of deploying AWS, and 
the likelihood of unpredictable interactions between difer-
ent computational algorithms. Tamburrini (2016) argues that 
swarms of AWS could weaken traditional nuclear deterrent 
factors based on mutually assured destruction (swarms of 
AWS could be used to deliver destructive attacks on strategic 
nuclear and eliminate an opponent’s second strike nuclear 
capability, increasing preference for irst strike strategies). 
Amoroso and Tamburrini (2017) point out that AWS even 
without the ‘lethal’ element, if used to destroy buildings or 
infrastructure, would still have a global destabilising efect.
On the basis of the preceding account, three main catego-
ries of argument against AWS are identiied here:
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 (i) Arguments based on technology and the current and 
likely near future abilities of AWS to conform to IHL 
(i.e. what they can do).
 (ii) Deontological arguments based on the need for 
human judgement and meaningful human control 
of lethal and legal decisions, and on considerations 
of what AWS should do. These include arguments 
based on the concept of human dignity.
 (iii) Consequentialist reasons about their efects on the 
likelihood of going to war. These reasons include 
political arguments about their effects on global 
security, and are not necessarily labelled as conse-
quentialist.
In contrast to Amoroso and Tamburrini (2017), argu-
ments based on the abilities of AWS (i), are distinguished 
here from arguments about the need for human judgement 
(ii). This is in order to place an increased focus on what 
weapons systems and artiicial intelligence are capable of, 
and on the diferences between humans and computational 
artifacts or machines. The possibility that AWS will one 
day be able to conform to IHL is sometimes raised by those 
in favour of a ban (e.g. Asaro 2012; Heyns 2017). How-
ever this requires that they become moral agents, capable 
of empathic concern for humans and a real understanding 
of human social behaviour. There are those, including the 
present author, who question whether this will ever be pos-
sible (Sharkey 2017; Hew 2014; Johnson and Miller 2008).
Since the focus of this paper is on a consideration of the 
particular claim that AWS should be banned because they 
are against human dignity, we turn now to look at this idea 
in more detail.
Human dignity and lethal autonomous 
weapons
A number of writers and campaigners have stated that auton-
omous lethal weapons are against the notion of human dig-
nity. In a Human Rights Watch report, Goose writes ‘Fully 
autonomous weapons would also undermine human dignity, 
because as inanimate machines they could not understand 
or respect the value of life, yet they would have the power 
to determine when to take it away’ (Goose 2017). Docherty 
(2014) also presents arguments against autonomous weap-
ons, and states, ‘fully autonomous weapons could undermine 
the principle of dignity, which lies at the heart of interna-
tional human rights law and declares that every human is 
worthy of respect. An inanimate machine could not truly 
respect the value of a human life or comprehend the signii-
cance of its loss. Allowing a machine to make determina-
tions about when to take life away would vitiate the impor-
tance attached to such decisions and degrade human dignity’.
These quotations emphasise the idea that it is an afront 
to an individual’s dignity if the decision to kill them is made 
by a machine that does not recognise the value of their life. 
Heyns (2017) similarly asks, ‘Is it not an afront to human 
dignity if robots have the power of life and death over 
humans?’ He ofers a number of reasons for this being the 
case. Amongst them is that the person targeted by AWS is 
reduced to being ‘an object that has to be destroyed’, where 
there is no possibility of appealing to the humanity of the 
enemy. The use of autonomous weapons would remove the 
potentially restraining inluences of humanity. As well as 
the dignity of those killed or attacked by autonomous weap-
ons, Heyns also claims that the dignity of those in whose 
name such attacks are carried out is compromised, because 
the opportunity to be a moral person and to make moral 
decisions, is lost when machines are used to make lethal 
decisions.
Heyns’ arguments are based on what he holds to be the 
human right to a digniied life. Ulgen (2016) also argues that 
AWS are against human dignity, since they go against many 
of the central tenets of Kant’s account of human dignity. 
For one, the use of autonomous weapons denies the equality 
of persons since combatants using them are removed from 
physical risk at the same time as their targets are exposed to 
an increased risk. For another, autonomous weapons ‘dimin-
ish the duty not to harm others’. Like Heyns (2017), Ulgen 
insists that the use of such weapons ‘would devalue human-
ity by treating humans as disposable inanimate objects rather 
than ends with intrinsic value and rational thinking capacity’ 
(Ulgen 2016). They could increase the sufering and humili-
ation of targets—for example, certain Hellire missiles cause 
burning and incineration of bodies. Similarly, the continued 
threat and use of autonomous weapons can create unaccepta-
ble stress and psychological harm in the civilian population.
Johnson and Axinn (2013) also state that ‘To give a pro-
grammed machine the ability to ‘decide’ to kill a human is 
to abandon the concept of human dignity’ since to do so 
is to treat a rational being as an object. They insist that a 
machine cannot be moral, but can only follow the values of 
its programmers.
Asaro (2012) makes the case that to preserve human 
morality, justice and law, autonomous lethal systems must 
not be accepted, and concludes, ‘As a matter of the preserva-
tion of human morality, dignity, justice, and law we cannot 
accept an automated system making the decision to take a 
human life’ (Asaro 2012, p. 708, emphasis added). Bhuta 
et al. (2016) also emphasise the relationship between human 
dignity and law, and refer to what they term ‘the principle 
of human dignity’ in their discussions of AWS, pointing 
out its roots in human rights law, and in IHL. They cite the 
‘Martens Clause’ and its modern occurrence in Article 1(12) 
of Additional Protocol 1, according to which civilians and 
combatants remain under ‘the principles of international 
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law derived from established custom, from the principles 
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience’ (p. 
377). They state that AWS would be against human dignity 
because allowing machines (or objects) to make life or death 
decisions would compromise the value of each individual as 
a subject of law.
A report written for the Böll Foundation (Amoroso et al. 
2018) distinguishes between two kinds of argument that 
AWS are against human dignity: arguments centred on agent 
relevant duties and arguments centred on patient relevant 
rights. The report describes the agent relevant argument as 
being based on the need for the act of killing to be grounded 
in human judgement, since suppressing a human life can 
only be legally justiied if it is based on a considered and 
informed decision. The patient relevant argument is that 
human dignity would be denied if people were subject to 
robotic lethal decision making which gave them no possibil-
ity of appealing to the humanity of the enemy. The distinc-
tion between the two kinds of argument is interesting, and 
constitutes a step towards being more explicit about the rea-
sons for claiming that AWS are against human dignity. How-
ever, the report is focussed on providing an overall account 
of the risks of AWS for German foreign and security policy, 
and as such provides only limited consideration of human 
dignity, and does not address any of the criticisms of and 
questions about human dignity that have been raised.
Criticisms of human dignity claims
Some concerns have been raised about the merits of placing 
a strong emphasis on human dignity in arguments against 
autonomous weapons (Birnbacher 2016; Lin 2015; Saxton 
2016; Pop 2018). Lin (2015) raises various questions about 
whether AWS, or killer robots, violate the human right to 
life, and the right to human dignity. He asks whether they 
should be held to be against the Martens clause and the pub-
lic conscience. Although he raises concerns, his conclusion 
is merely that further work is needed to clarify the mean-
ing of dignity, the Martens clause, and human control and 
autonomy (see Human Rights Watch 2018 for a recent report 
on the Martens clause and AWS).
Saxton (2016) discusses what he terms the ‘problem 
with the human dignity argument’ about killer robots. He 
claims that arguments based on human dignity often ‘fail to 
grasp the complexity of evaluating human dignity in war-
fare’. According to him, the use of autonomous weapons 
should not be viewed as a violation of human dignity ‘due 
solely to the weapon’s autonomy’, although his objections to 
what he terms the human dignity argument are not explicitly 
stated. He acknowledges that autonomous weapons could 
remove the possibility of empathy and compassion between 
combatants, and could therefore result in greater killing and 
sufering as the ‘moral distance’ between the military and 
their targets is increased. His objection seems to be to claims 
that to be killed by an autonomous weapon rather than by 
a human is necessarily against human dignity. He points 
out that this is not the only way that human dignity can be 
compromised: it is generally compromised in war when 
humans are sacriiced to achieve military objectives. His 
argument is that autonomous weapons threaten human dig-
nity by ‘potentially changing the dynamic between weapons 
and their operators’. He is concerned not to lose the poten-
tial advantages that automation could bring to warfare, and 
argues against the need for a ban. Instead he suggests that 
further thought and investigation is needed to ensure that 
enough human control of weapons is maintained to ensure 
that humans can remain responsible and accountable for 
their use. Although his objections to arguments based on 
human dignity are not clear, he raises pertinent issues, such 
as the idea that human dignity is generally compromised by 
warfare, and not only by autonomous weapons.
Birnbacher (2016) has been the main critic of the empha-
sis on human dignity in arguments against AWS, and his 
arguments are more explicit. He acknowledges the many 
risks and problems of AWS, but disagrees with particular 
claims about the threats to human dignity. He objects to what 
he terms ‘inlationary’ uses of the term. In Birnbacher’s 
account, the term ‘human dignity’ should be applied only 
to the individual and not to the human species as a whole. 
As a consequence, he complains about examples in which 
‘dignity’ is applied to the human species, as it is when it 
is claimed that delegating the kill decision to machines is 
against human dignity. This complaint is a little contentious, 
since as will be discussed in the next section, there is interest 
in the idea of collective dignity. It could also be argued that 
each individual delegation of a kill decision to a machine 
is against that individual’s human dignity, and that there is 
no need to assume that in such instances ‘dignity’ is being 
applied to the human species as a whole.1
Birnbacher also objects to a tendency to equate human 
dignity with the whole of morality. This, he argues, is a 
problem because it weakens the concept of dignity and 
would mean that every immoral act was against human dig-
nity. A further objection that he raises is to the use of the 
term as the expression of an emotional reaction and as a 
rhetorical device without any further speciic meaning.
For Birnbacher, human dignity only applies to the indi-
vidual and implies a set of basic human rights. His ‘tenta-
tive’ list (Birnbacher 2016) consists of the following: (1) the 
right not to be severely humiliated and made the object of 
public contempt; (2) the right to a minimum of freedom of 
action and decision; (3) the right to receive support in situ-
ations of severe need; (4) the right to a minimum quality 
1 A point made by an anonymous reviewer of this paper.
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of life and relief of sufering; (5) the right not to be treated 
merely as a means to other people’s ends, i.e. without con-
sent and with severe harm or risk of harm. Based on this 
reasoning, he considers the question of whose individual 
dignity might be afected by the deployment of autonomous 
weapons and how it might be afected. He concludes that 
the most likely candidate is the dignity of individual civil-
ians (not the dignity of combatants since soldiers already 
know what is involved in war and may have the possibility 
of opting out). Civilians cannot usually remove themselves 
from the situation, and are at risk from direct attack, or inci-
dental losses from attacks aimed at military targets. How-
ever, when Birnbacher considers how autonomous weapons 
could directly afect the dignity of civilians, he disagrees 
with Heyns’ statement that ‘giving machines greater power 
to take life and death decisions is demeaning’ and that AWS 
should therefore be taken to violate the ‘right to dignity’ 
(Heyns 2017). Birnbacher does not accept that the use of 
lethal autonomous weapons per se directly results in civil-
ians being demeaned or humiliated, except through the 
creation of mental pain and subjective sufering. He does 
agree that AWS pose threats to civilians by preventing even 
a minimal quality of life and that to deploy such weapons 
against them is to treat them as a means to an end that does 
not relect their own aims and interests.
Birnbacher points out a number of features of autonomous 
weapons that are likely to cause severe dread in civilians. 
These include the usually asymmetrical nature of their use, 
where only one side in the conlict possesses such weapons. 
Then there is the unpredictability and inscrutability of the 
weapons, and their limited capacity to discriminate between 
combatants and non-combatants and to observe the rules of 
proportionality. All these are reasons why the threat of an 
attack by AWS could create such intense ‘mental pain’ as to 
be contrary to the human dignity of their actual and potential 
victims. Such mental pain could be held to be against human 
dignity in the same way that torture is. However such pain, 
fear and anxiety are not unique features of AWS, and could 
also apply to other weapons, such as remote controlled mis-
siles and drones, depending on their use.
In an ICRC blog, Pop (2018) also considers the relation-
ship between human dignity and anti-AWS arguments. Her 
complaint is that there is too little relection on how human 
dignity is used in such arguments to warrant the conclusion 
that allowing a machine to decide to kill a human is against 
human dignity. This is an important point, and one that 
coheres with the argument of this paper, although a wider 
selection of accounts of dignity is considered here. Pop 
identiies two interpretations of dignity and considers their 
relationship to arguments against AWS. The irst is the inter-
pretation of dignity based on the Kantian notion that human 
dignity stands for unconditional intrinsic value, which has 
its source in human autonomy. According to this view, AWS 
would afect the human ability to make self-determined 
choices, and would therefore be against this sense of human 
dignity. But so too would any force which harms or inter-
feres with human agency. She also identiies a diferent view 
of human dignity as noble rank or status, as articulated by 
Waldron (2009). For Waldron, dignity has its origins in the 
notion of noble rank and status, but ‘the modern notion of 
human dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so 
that we now try to accord to every human being something 
of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was for-
merly accorded to nobility’ (Waldron 2009, p. 229). Pop 
suggests that an argument could be made to the efect that to 
be killed by a machine, a lesser entity, would be against this 
conception of human dignity. However, as she points out, 
this is not the argument that is made in anti-AWS arguments. 
Her main conclusion is that the reasons for claiming that 
AWS are against human dignity are not suiciently spelled 
out. In the absence of a consensus about the meaning of 
human dignity, she suggests the concept should not be used 
in the AWS debate.
Difering accounts of human dignity
As well as the criticisms that have been made of the use of 
human dignity in arguments against AWS, another set of 
problems stems from a lack of clarity about what human 
dignity actually is. This lack of clarity has been complained 
about by a number of authors in a variety of contexts. Sev-
eral writers have complained that the term is used too fre-
quently. For instance, Macklin (2003) states that it is so 
frequently invoked in a medical context that its use could 
be eliminated ‘without any loss of content’. Pinker, in a criti-
cism of a report on human dignity and bioethics, derides it as 
‘a squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight 
moral demands assigned to it’ (Pinker 2008). Werner (2014) 
describes dignity as ‘a heavily contested, multifaceted, and 
ambiguous concept’. Shultziner (2007) reviews its uses and 
points out that dignity is used in diferent ways in many dif-
ferent contexts.
It is recognised that there are contradictions amongst 
the diferent uses of the term ‘dignity’, when it is both 
talked about as something that can be lost or reduced 
through humiliating treatment, yet also cited as the basis 
for the right to be treated humanely. Nordenfelt (2003) 
points out the paradox of the classic concentration camp 
example, in which prisoners are seen as being degraded 
and robbed of their dignity by inhuman treatment, even 
though it is recognised that everyone is of equal value 
and has a dignity that cannot be taken away. This paradox 
can be resolved by distinguishing between the inviolable 
or universal dignity that is an inherent property of human 
beings, and other forms of dignity that can be held to vary-
ing degrees (Bostrom 2008; Schroeder 2010; Nordenfelt 
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2004). Inviolable dignity is closely related to the concept 
of human rights, and cannot be removed by dint of humil-
iating treatment. Many international documents refer to 
human dignity as the justiication for human rights. For 
instance, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
preamble states that ‘the recognition of the inherent dig-
nity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world’. The Basic Law of Germany, Arti-
cle 1, sentence 1, states, “Human dignity is inviolable. 
To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority” 
(1949).
Apart from inviolable dignity, there are other forms 
of dignity that are attributable to individuals to varying 
degrees. For Bostrom (2008) these include a form of dig-
nity he terms ‘dignity of status’, which refers to the posi-
tion and standing of an individual: (Schroeder 2010 uses the 
term ‘aristocratic dignity’, and; Nordenfelt 2004, ‘dignity 
of merit’ for what appear to be the same idea). Then there 
is ‘dignity of quality’ (Bostrom 2008) ‘meritorious dig-
nity’ (Schroeder 2010) and ‘dignity of moral or existential 
character’ (Nordenfelt 2004), all of which are used to refer 
to exceptional individuals who act in an honourable way, 
especially when in adverse circumstances (Nelson Mandela 
being a paradigmatic example).
Jacobson (2009), in the context of healthcare and human 
rights, provides a taxonomy of dignity. She reports a qualita-
tive grounded theory exploration of dignity based on semi-
structured interviews with persons marginalised by health 
and social status, or providing services to those persons, and 
those working in the ield of human rights and health. On the 
basis of previous literature, she distinguishes between invio-
lable human dignity, and social dignity. She then divides 
social dignity into dignity of self, and dignity in relation. 
Dignity of self is a quality of self-respect and self-worth. 
Dignity in relation ‘refers to the ways in which respect and 
worth are conveyed through individual and collective behav-
iour’ (Jacobson 2009). On the basis of interviews, she iden-
tiies the ways in which her participants felt their dignity 
had been violated, or promoted. Individual dignity could be 
harmed or beneited by injuries or beneits to the self, by vio-
lations or respect to the body, and by injuries or beneits to 
moral agency or personhood. An example of an injury to the 
self is where a person is treated with contempt—as if they 
had no value, or excluded from physical or social settings. 
Collective dignity could be harmed by processes such as dis-
crimination and exclusion, or promoted through recognition 
and acceptance. Interestingly, Jacobson also identiies some 
of the long-term consequences of dignity violations whereby 
an individual experiences a series of losses, including loss 
of self-worth, loss of moral standing, and loss of conidence. 
The longer-term efects on individuals include social mar-
ginalisation, passivity and chronically poor physical and 
mental health. The collective efects include group trauma-
tisation, and a loss of dignity.
Not only is it possible to identify diferent forms of dig-
nity, there are also cultural variations in the way in which 
the concept of dignity can be interpreted. Shultziner (2007) 
points out how the set of values implied by the idea of 
human dignity can difer between societies. For instance, 
an Islamic interpretation of human dignity may be quite dif-
ferent to that of a Western liberal-democracy—involving for 
instance a diferent view of materialism, and of the rights 
and social position of men and women. The values implied 
by human dignity have also changed over time. Thus from 
the nineteenth century, slavery has been seen as an afront to 
human dignity, but the institution of slavery has a long his-
tory starting with the ancient civilisations of Mesopotamia, 
India, China and Greece and was not always viewed as we 
view it now. There can be diferent views of dignity within 
contemporary society also: for instance, many see rights to 
abortion and euthanasia as representative of human worth 
and dignity, whilst others see them as an afront to human 
dignity.
In addition to cultural and historical differences, the 
meanings attributed to dignity vary according to context. 
The meanings of dignity in a health context are likely to 
be quite diferent to the meanings of dignity in a war zone. 
In health care, as discussed by Sharkey (2014), concerns 
about dignity are often related to bodily functions, access 
to toileting facilities, and being addressed respectfully. In a 
war zone, the interpretation of dignity is likely to be quite 
diferent, and overriding concerns about death, sufering, 
and stress will leave little room for worries about personal 
hygiene.
Questions have also been raised about the extent to which 
there is such a thing as collective dignity, or whether dig-
nity is only something that can apply to the individual, as 
is argued by Birnbacher (2016). Werner (2014) points out a 
growing number of references to collective dignity (e.g. De 
Gaay Fortman 2011; Falk 2009), but claims that the term is 
often used without any attempt to clarify its meaning. One 
of the uses of ‘collective dignity’ that Werner points out 
refers to the duties of a collective, for instance the duties of 
a government or similar organisation. Another use is when 
human rights are being emphasised: for instance where the 
collective dignity of an identiiable group is said to have 
been reduced when one member of the group is humili-
ated. A third use is the idea of collective human dignity that 
is shared among the members of the human species. This 
form of collective human dignity is more often referred to 
in the context of bioethics, where it might be claimed for 
instance, that human cloning was against the dignity of the 
species. Werner agrees that it is conceptually possible to 
ascribe dignity to a collective, in the sense that the collec-
tive has certain rights or duties. However he argues against 
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the usefulness of this. He claims that although membership 
of a collective might invoke certain rights or duties, it is not 
clear that these can be usefully described as collective rights 
or duties—or whether they should be seen as individual.
Although it is clear that human rights and dignity are 
closely related, both historically and conceptually, there is 
also some confusion and disagreement about whether dig-
nity is itself a right, or whether it forms a justiication for 
human rights. Heyns (2017) talks of the right to human dig-
nity, but in a review of its uses, Shultziner (2007) claims that 
dignity is more often used as a ‘bedrock truth justiication’ 
for human rights than as a right in itself. For Birnbacher 
(2016), as stated earlier, human dignity should only be 
applied to the individual, and not to the human species as a 
whole. As described earlier, he proposes that the human dig-
nity inherent in the individual implies a set of basic human 
rights which include; the right to a minimum of freedom of 
action and decision; the right to a minimum of quality of 
life and relief of sufering; and the right not to be treated 
merely as a means to other people’s ends. He adds that pri-
vacy should also be considered a right. He emphasises that 
only a minimum of each right is covered by human dignity. 
In this, his set of basic human rights bears some similarity 
to a related list provided by Nussbaum (2006, 2011) in her 
account of the capability approach (CA).
Nussbaum (2006, 2011) uses the concept of dignity as the 
basis for a list of human rights or capabilities. Her concept 
of human dignity takes a wider perspective. She argues that 
for a life worthy of human dignity, all humans should be able 
to achieve at least a threshold level of ten central capabili-
ties. The full list can be found elsewhere (Nussbaum 2006, 
pp. 24–33), but it includes items such as (1) life: being able 
to live to the end of a life of normal length; not dying pre-
maturely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth 
living; (3) bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from 
place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including 
sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities 
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduc-
tion; (5) emotions. being able to have attachments to things 
and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and 
care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to 
grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justiied anger. 
Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear 
and anxiety, and (10) control over one’s environment. The 
list of ten capabilities is described by Nussbaum (2006) as 
‘open-ended and subject to on-going rethinking and revi-
sion, in the way that any society’s account of its most fun-
damental entitlements is always subject to supplementation 
(or deletion)’ (p. 78). The CA has been found to provide a 
useful framework by a number of writers on robot ethics 
(Coeckelbergh 2010; Borenstein and Pearson 2010; Sharkey 
2014; Vallor 2011), but its relevance to military action, and 
to AWS does not yet seem to have been explicitly discussed. 
Nonetheless, it provides a comprehensive account of human 
dignity, and as such is relevant here.
In summary, it should be apparent that not only have 
some speciic questions been raised about the impact of 
AWS on human dignity, but also that there is a lack of a 
clear consensus about what dignity is. There are questions 
about whether collective dignity is a meaningful concept, 
or whether dignity is something that applies only to the 
individual. Diferent contexts lead to difering emphases on 
aspects of dignity, and views of dignity vary with culture and 
over time. Sometimes dignity is assumed to be a human right 
itself (Heyns 2017), and sometimes it is seen as the basis for 
human rights (Birnbacher 2016; Nussbaum 2006).
Questions about human dignity and AWS
Now that we have looked at the main arguments against 
AWS, the claims that made by some that they compromise 
human dignity, and some problems that have been raised 
about these claims, it is time for further relections. These 
reflections will be organised around a set of questions 
emerging from the previous discussions:
1. What are the main ways in which AWS can be said to 
threaten human dignity?
2. Are there advantages for the campaign against killer 
robots in claiming that AWS are against human dignity?
3. Are AWS against human dignity in a way that other 
weapons are not?
4. Are claims based on human dignity the best way to argue 
against AWS?
Q1: What are the main ways in which AWS can be 
said to threaten human dignity?
An account of the claims made about AWS and human dig-
nity was provided in “Human dignity and lethal autonomous 
weapons” section. They are summarised and extended here. 
It is apparent from the preceding discussions that there are 
a number of diferent ways in which AWS can be said to be 
against human dignity. A particular claim about AWS and 
human dignity has been described in a UNIDIR report as 
‘being at the core of the concerns raised about fully autono-
mous weapons’ (UNIDIR 2015). The claim is that allowing 
a weapon system to make a kill decision is against human 
dignity because weapons, computers and robots are unable 
to understand or respect the value of life, or understand the 
signiicance of its loss (Docherty 2014; Goose 2017; Heyns 
2017).
AWS have also been held to be against human dig-
nity because they cannot conform to the laws of war, and 
because they replace the human relection that is essential 
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for justice, morality and law. Human interpretation of law 
is both assumed and required. This argument is made by 
Asaro (2012), and by Heyns (2017) when he claims that a 
lack of human deliberation would render any lethal decisions 
arbitrary and unaccountable.
There are also a number of ways in which AWS can be 
shown to be against Kantian dignity, as shown by Ulgen 
(2016). They can reduce the equality of persons, especially 
since they are often used only one side in a conlict. They 
diminish the duty not to harm others. They can also increase 
sufering and humiliation and create unacceptable psycho-
logical stress.
Birnbacher (2016) takes the view that human dignity 
implies a set of basic human rights, which include the right 
to a minimum of freedom of action and decision, the right to 
a minimum level of quality of life and relief of sufering and 
the right not to be treated as a means to other people’s ends. 
AWS could afect all of these: limiting freedom, reducing 
quality of life, and creating sufering.
Birnbacher’s view is related to Nussbaum’s version of the 
CA, in which it is held that a life worthy of human dignity 
requires a threshold level of a set of 10 central capabilities. 
If we extrapolate from the CA, since its relevance to AWS 
has not yet been established, it is apparent that AWS would 
have a negative impact on several of the central capabilities, 
including (1) living a life of normal length, (3) being able 
to move freely from place to place, (5) not having one’s 
emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety, and 
(10) control over one’s environment. Thus within the context 
of the CA, AWS can be seen to be against human dignity 
because they would have a negative efect on people’s access 
to at least four central capabilities that are essential for a life 
worthy of human dignity.
It seems that there are several ways in which AWS can 
be seen to reduce or diminish human dignity. Are there any 
ways in which they could be claimed to enhance it? It is 
diicult to see how this could be the case. In a diferent con-
text, Jacobson (2009) reported some examples of processes 
that seem to promote dignity in persons marginalised by 
health and social status; for example, empowerment (work-
ing with others to enhance their capacities, capabilities and 
competencies); recognition (acknowledging the humanity of 
others by paying attention and showing appreciation); and 
Levelling (minimising asymmetry). However AWS seem 
unlikely candidates for promoting any of these, and indeed 
seem to do the opposite. Lin (2015) hints at one way in 
which AWS might result in an increase in human dignity 
compared to other weapons when he mentions the possibility 
that autonomous weapons might not need to be lethal at all 
since they do not need to protect their own lives, and could 
wound combatants rather than killing them. It might also be 
argued that Artiicial Intelligence, robots and their sensors 
could be used to improve awareness of what is happening in 
the ‘fog of war’ and to reduce civilian casualties, but such 
information could be made available to human commanders, 
and does not itself legitimise the use of AWS.
The fact that it is possible to identify a variety of ways in 
which AWS can be held to be against human dignity illus-
trates and reinforces reasons for supporting a ban. It also 
indicates a problem with using dignity as the basis for argu-
ments against them. The underlying diiculty is the lack 
of consensus about the meaning of dignity—although the 
preservation of human dignity is generally recognised as 
essential, what this means varies between cultures, contexts, 
historical era, and philosophical position.
Q2: Are there advantages for the campaign 
against killer robots to claiming that AWS are 
against human dignity?
There could be some campaigning advantages. Saying that 
something is against human dignity evokes a strong visceral 
response. Even though dignity is diicult to deine clearly, 
people have an intuitive understanding of its meaning, and of 
the importance of maintaining and preserving it. Reference 
to human dignity can highlight a repugnance to the idea of 
machines having the power of life or death decisions over 
humans, as highlighted in a UNIDIR report (2015).
Claiming that AWS are against human dignity accentuates 
and underlines concerns about these weapons. A statement 
by the university president of the South Korean university, in 
response to a letter from an international group of scientists 
calling for a boycott of the university, illustrates this: ‘I reaf-
irm once again that KAIST will not conduct any research 
activities counter to human dignity including autonomous 
weapons lacking meaningful human control’. (emphasis 
added: The Guardian, “‘Killer robots’: AI experts call for 
boycott over lab at South Korea University” 5th April 2015).
Q3: Are AWS against human dignity in a way 
that other weapons are not?
Answering this question is important in order to establish 
whether it can be argued that AWS, that are not subject to 
meaningful human control, are against dignity when other 
weapons that cause death and sufering are not. However, it 
is not clear how this question should be answered—and this 
illustrates again a problem with basing arguments for a ban 
exclusively on human dignity. It is possible to identify at 
least three answers to this question.
First it can be claimed that war and killing in general are 
against human dignity. Hasenclever (2014) describes war as 
a moral evil and states that ‘human dignity requires the abro-
gation of war’. For those adopting this position, the deploy-
ment of AWS in battle would be contrary to human dignity, 
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but so too would any lethal weapon or weapons system, even 
those entirely operated and controlled by humans.
A second answer would be to acknowledge the inevita-
bility of weapons and war, but to contend that any weapons 
that caused extreme sufering and humiliation were against 
human dignity. This would mean that AWS could be argued 
to be against human dignity, but so too would other weapons 
such as chemical weapons, and nuclear attack. Birnbacher 
(2016) holds this position, and argues that AWS and other 
weapons such as remote controlled missiles could have a 
negative impact on the dignity of individuals: interfering 
with their basic human rights by causing subjective pain and 
mental sufering. Similarly, it is argued here in the context of 
the CA that weapons that have a negative impact on access 
to central capabilities should be seen as afecting the ability 
to lead a life worthy of human dignity. Under a Kantian view 
of dignity, it can also be argued that as well as AWS, any 
weapons that cause extreme sufering should be considered 
to be against human dignity (Ulgen 2016).
A third response is to agree that AWS are against human 
dignity in a way that other weapons are not. As we have 
seen, it has been suggested that ‘death by algorithm’ crosses 
a moral line and is against human dignity because AWS will 
be unable to understand or value the human lives that they 
were taking (Goose 2017; Docherty 2014; Heyns 2017).
Q4: How important are claims based on human 
dignity for arguments against AWS?
This question is central to our consideration of the relation-
ships between dignity and AWS. In the light of the issues 
reviewed in this paper, it is concluded here that although 
dignity is an important concern when considering AWS, it 
is not suicient on its own. It works best as part of a cluster 
of other arguments about legal compliance, global security 
and technical competence. The main problem is, as we have 
seen, the lack of consensus about the meaning of human 
dignity. There are questions about whether it makes sense 
to talk of afronts to collective dignity (Werner 2014), or 
whether the term dignity should only be applied to indi-
viduals. Views of dignity can also be shown to change with 
time and context (Shultziner 2007). There are also difering 
views as to whether dignity should be viewed as a human 
right (Heyns 2017), or as the basis for human rights (Birn-
bacher 2016).
The lack of clarity associated with claims about AWS and 
human dignity can be further illustrated by reconsidering 
the statement from the KAIST president, quoted earlier, in 
which he airms that KAIST will not conduct any research 
activities ‘counter to human dignity’ (The Guardian, “‘Killer 
robots’: AI experts call for boycott over lab at South Korea 
University” 5th April 2015). It is clear that the statement 
assumes that AWS are against human dignity—what is not 
clear is what other research activities will be avoided in the 
future. A strong interpretation could be that the university 
will not undertake any further military research. An even 
stronger one would be that KAIST will avoid research in 
which artiicial intelligence is used to replace meaningful 
human control. Or perhaps the statement means that the 
university will not research weapons that do not conform to 
IHL. Although the statement has a pleasing resonance to it, 
its meaning is unclear because of the ambiguity associated 
with the concept of human dignity.
Concluding that arguments based on human dignity are 
not the best way to argue against AWS is not at all the same 
as saying that such weapons are acceptable. As explained 
earlier, there are strong reasons to oppose their use and to 
argue for a ban. A complete review of all of the reasons and 
arguments against AWS is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but three main categories of argument were identiied: (i) 
arguments based on technology and the current and likely 
near future abilities of AWS to conform to IHL; (ii) argu-
ments based on the need for human judgement and meaning-
ful human control of lethal decisions; and (iii) arguments 
about the expected efects of AWS on the likelihood of going 
to war and on global instability.
Of course, deciding which of these categories of argu-
ment are the most convincing will depend on who is being 
addressed. Politicians might well be more convinced by 
arguments in the third category based on the efects of AWS 
on global instability. Philosophers and lawyers would prob-
ably be more convinced by arguments in the second category 
about the need for human judgement in matters of law and 
justice. Artiicial Intelligence researchers might be more 
interested in the irst category. There is also the possibility 
of combining the arguments, instead of selecting the most 
appropriate. Amoroso and Tamburrini (2017) present an 
interesting idea for combining deontological and consequen-
tial reasons by means of a conluence model that resolves 
potential conlicts between deontological and consequential 
arguments by prioritising deontological arguments.
For this author, the most convincing arguments for a ban 
of AWS are those in the irst category that focus on the cur-
rent and foreseeable future abilities of robots and computer 
systems. AWS are unable to reliably discriminate between 
civilians and combatants, both because it is not possible to 
formulate a set of rules that will always enable such dis-
crimination, but also because they do not have the necessary 
situational awareness and understanding of human actions 
and intentions. This lack of situational awareness and under-
standing also means that the principles of proportionality 
and military understanding are beyond them. These require 
informed and considered human judgement, and a moral 
understanding and competence. As discussed by Sharkey 
(2017), not only do current machines not have these abilities, 
there is also no good reason to expect that machines can be 
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either programmed or trained to develop an understanding 
of what is and is not morally acceptable. As well as their 
relevance for arguments in favour of a ban on AWS, the 
limitations of computational artifacts, and the diferences 
between living and artiicial machines, also imply the need 
to limit or prohibit the use of robots in other spheres of life 
where their use would have a signiicant impact on humans.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between 
human dignity and AWS, or ‘killer robots’. We have looked 
at the main arguments that have been made against the use of 
these weapons, and distinguished between three categories 
of argument. We have considered the claims that have been 
made that the use of AWS is against human dignity, the 
objections made to these claims, and the lack of consensus 
about the meaning of ‘human dignity’.
A set of four questions were then identiied and addressed 
in an efort to clarify the relationship between AWS and 
human dignity.
Q1.  What are the main ways in which AWS can be said to 
threaten human dignity?
Q2.  Are there advantages for the campaign against killer 
robots in claiming that AWS are against human 
dignity?
Q3.  Are AWS against human dignity in a way that other 
weapons are not?
Q4.  How important are claims based on human dignity for 
arguments in favour of a ban on AWS?
On the basis of the foregoing reviews and discussions, 
it is clear that AWS should be considered to be against 
human dignity. In answer to Q1 [What are the main ways in 
which AWS can be said to threaten human dignity?], several 
reasons for claiming that AWS are against human dignity 
were identiied. Q2 [Are there advantages for the campaign 
against killer robots in claiming that AWS are against human 
dignity?] was answered by agreeing that there could be some 
campaigning advantages to claiming that AWS are an afront 
to human dignity: even though it may not be clear what is 
meant by saying that something is against human dignity, it 
can still function as a rallying cry.
The response to Q3 [Are AWS against human dignity 
in a way that other weapons are not?] was to point out 
that even though it can be readily concluded that AWS are 
against human dignity, they are not unique in this respect. 
There are other weapons that cause pain and sufering 
which should also be viewed as being against human dig-
nity. There are also other uses of robots which could create 
sufering, or limit individuals’ access to aspects of life 
necessary for a life worthy of human dignity. For instance, 
Sharkey (2014) argues that there are uses of robots, such 
as employing them for the exclusive care of older peo-
ple, which should be considered to be against the view of 
human dignity represented by the CA.
There are also other uses of technology that can be 
seen as being against human dignity. Heyns (2017) looks 
beyond warfare and raises concerns about where we allow 
machines to make decisions. He states that allowing 
machines to make non-lethal decisions that afect humans 
is also against human dignity, writing, “The notion of 
‘meaningful human control’ should be developed as 
a guiding principle not only for the use of autonomous 
weapons, but for the use of artiicial intelligence in gen-
eral; not merely focussing on isolated uses of such technol-
ogies but on the role of technology as such in our future. 
Allowing technology not only to supplement but indeed 
to replace human decision-making will undermine the 
very reason why life is valuable in the irst place.” (Heyns 
2017). His argument is that we should be concerned about 
replacing human-decision making with machines, and asks 
how far the process of transferring power from humans to 
machines should go. He suggests that autonomous weap-
ons, with life or death stakes, are a pivotal test case.
It seems then that there are many technological applica-
tions that can be considered to impact the human dignity 
of individuals. It is also the case that human behaviour 
can have a negative efect on individual dignity. However 
if it is accepted that there are many weapons, artifacts, 
and human behaviours that are held to be against human 
dignity, then this itself becomes a reason for not relying 
too heavily on human dignity in arguments against AWS, 
as distinct from other means and weapons of warfare. 
Another reason stems from the previously identiied lack 
of consensus about, and the difering accounts of what 
human dignity actually is.
So after these relections, the inal conclusions drawn 
here are that human dignity can indeed be said to be com-
promised by the use of AWS, but also that there are many 
diferent interpretations of human dignity and many dif-
ferent ways in which it can be afected. The answer given 
to Q4 [How important are claims based on human dignity 
for arguments against AWS?] is essentially that the risk to 
human dignity is only one of many reasons for calling for 
a ban of autonomous weapons and for insisting on the need 
for meaningful human control of lethal weapons in war; 
and it is not the most compelling. Three categories of rea-
sons for opposing AWS were identiied here. In opposing 
the development and use of AWS it makes sense to be able 
to draw on them all, combining them or choosing the most 
relevant, and not relying exclusively on any one of them.
 A. Sharkey 
1 3
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Bonnie Docherty and Noel 
Sharkey for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Amoroso, D., Sauer, F., Sharkey, N., Suchman, L., & Tamburrini, G. 
(2018). Autonomy in weapon systems: The military application 
of artiicial intelligence as a litmus test for Germany’s new foreign 
and security policy. In Heinrich Böll Stiftung publication series 
on democracy (Vol. 49).
Amoroso, D., & Tamburrini, G. (2017). The ethical and legal case 
against autonomy in weapons systems. Global Jurist. https ://doi.
org/10.1515/gj-2017-0012
Arkin, R. C. (2009). Governing lethal behavior in autonomous robots. 
Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Asaro, P. (2012). On banning autonomous lethal systems: Human 
rights, automation and the dehumanizing of lethal decision-mak-
ing, special issue on new technologies and warfare. International 
Review of the Red Cross, 94(886), 687–709.
Bhuta, N., Beck, S., & Geiss, R. (2016). Present futures: Concluding 
relections and open questions on autonomous weapons systems. 
In N. Bhuta, S. Beck, R. Geiβ, H. Liu, & C. Kreβ (Eds.), Autono-
mous weapons systems: Law, ethics, policy (Vol. 15, pp. 347–
383). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Birnbacher, D. (2016). Are autonomous weapon systems a threat to 
human dignity? In N. Bhuta, S. Beck, R. Geiβ, H. Liu, & C. 
Kreβ (Eds.), Autonomous weapons systems: Law, ethics, policy 
(pp. 105–121). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Borenstein, J., & Pearson, Y. (2010). Robot caregivers: Harbingers of 
expanded freedom for all? Ethics and Information Technology, 
12(3), 277–288.
Bostrom, N. (2008). Dignity and enhancement. In Human dignity 
and bioethics: Essays commissioned by the council on bioeth-
ics (pp. 173–207). Washington, DC: The President’s Council on 
Bioethics.
Coeckelbergh, M. (2010). Health care, capabilities, and AI assistive 
technologies. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 13(2), 181–190.
De Gaay Fortman, B. (2011). Minority rights: A major misconception? 
Human Rights Quarterly, 33(2), 265–303.
Docherty, B.L. (2014). Shaking the foundations: The human rights 
implications of killer robots. https ://www.hrw.org/repor 
t/2014/05/12/shaki ng-found ation s/human -right s-impli catio ns-
kille r-robot s.
Falk, R. A. (2009). Achieving human rights. New York: Routledge.
Goose, S. (2017). The growing international movement against killer 
robots. Harvard International Review. Accessed May 17, 2018 
from http://hir.harva rd.edu/artic le/?a=14022 .
Hasenclever, A. (2014). Human dignity and war. In M. Düwell, J. 
Braarvig, R. Brownsword, & D. Mieth (Eds.), The Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity: Interdisciplinary perspectives 
(pp. 439–445). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https ://
doi.org/10.1017/CBO97 80511 97903 3.054.
Hew, P. C. (2014). Artiicial moral agents are infeasible with fore-
seeable technologies. Ethics and Information Technology, 16, 
197–206.
Heyns, C. (2013). Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, A/HRC/23/47. New York: 
United Nations.
Heyns, C. (2016). Autonomous weapons systems: Living a digniied 
life and dying a digniied death. In N. Bhuta, S. Beck, R. Geiβ, 
H. Liu, & C. Kreβ (Eds.), Autonomous weapons systems: Law, 
ethics, policy (pp. 3–20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Heyns, C. (2017). Autonomous weapons in armed conlict and the right 
to a digniied life: An African perspective. South African Journal 
on Human Rights, 33(1), 46–71.
Human Rights Watch. (2012). Losing humanity: The case against killer 
robots. Accessed May 17, 2018, from http://www.hrw.org/repor 
ts/2012/11/19/losin g-human ity-0.
Human Rights Watch. (2014). Shaking the foundations: The human 
rights implications of killer robots. https ://www.hrw.org/repor 
t/2014/05/12/shaki ng-found ation s/human -right s-impli catio ns-
kille r-robot s.
Human Rights Watch. (2018). Heed the call: A moral and legal impera-
tive to ban killer robots. https ://www.hrw.org/repor t/2018/08/21/
heed-call/moral -and-legal -imper ative -ban-kille r-robot s.
ICRC (2014). ICRC, autonomous weapon systems: Technical, military, 
legal and humanitarian aspects. In Expert meeting. Geneva, Swit-
zerland, 26–28 March 2014, 1 November 2014, 3.
Jacobson, N. (2009). A taxonomy of dignity: A grounded theory 
study. BMC International Health and Human Rights. https ://doi.
org/10.1186/1472-698X-9-3
Johnson, A. M., & Axinn, S. (2013). The morality of autonomous 
robots. Journal of Military Ethics, 12(2), 129–141.
Johnson, D. G., & Miller, K. W. (2008). Un-making artiicial moral 
agents. Ethics and Information Technology, 10, 123–133.
Lin, P. (2015). Do killer robots violate human rights? The Atlantic. 
Accessed May 17, 2018 from https ://www.theat lanti c.com/techn 
ology /archi ve/2015/04/do-kille r-robot s-viola te-human -right 
s/39003 3/.
Macklin, R. (2003). Dignity is a useless concept. British Medical Jour-
nal, 327, 1419–1420.
Nordenfelt, L. (2003). Dignity of the elderly: An introduction. Medi-
cine, Health Care and Philosophy, 6(2), 99–101.
Nordenfelt, L. (2004). The varieties of dignity. Health Care Analysis, 
12(2), 69–81.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2006). Frontiers of justice. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities: The human develop-
ment approach. Belknap Press: Harvard University.
Pinker, S. (2008). The stupidity of dignity. Washington, DC: The New 
Republic.
Pop, A. (2018). Autonomous weapons systems: A threat to human dig-
nity? Humanitarian Law and Policy, ICRC blog. Consulted May 
17, 2018 from http://blogs .icrc.org/law-and-polic y/.
Saxton, A. (2016). (Un)dignified killer robots? The problem with the 
human dignity argument. Lawfare blog. Consulted May 17, 2018 
from https ://www.lawfa reblo g.com/undig niie d-kille r-robot s-probl 
em-human -digni ty-argum ent.
Schroeder, D. (2010). Dignity: One, two, three, four, ive, still count-
ing. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 19(1), 118–125.
Sharkey, A. (2014). Robots and human dignity: A consideration of 
the efects of robot care on the dignity of older people. Ethics 
and Information Technology, 16, 63–75. https ://doi.org/10.1007/
s1067 6-014-9338-5. 1.
Sharkey, A. (2017). Can we program or train robots to be good? Eth-
ics and Information Technology. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1067 
6-017-9425-5.
Sharkey, N. (2008). Grounds for discrimination: Autonomous robot. 
RUSI Defence Systems, 11, 86–89.
Sharkey, N. (2012a). The evitability of autonomous robot warfare. 
International Review of the Red Cross, 94(886), 787–799.
Autonomous weapons systems, killer robots and human dignity 
1 3
Sharkey, N. (2012b). Automating warfare: Lessons learned from the 
drones. Journal of Law, Information and Science, 21(2), 140.
Shultziner, D. (2007). Human dignity: Functions and meanings. In J. 
Malpas & N. Lickiss (Eds.), Perspectives on human dignity: A 
conversation. Dordrecht: Springer.
Suchman, L. (2016). Situational awareness and adherence to the princi-
ple of distinction as a necessary condition for lawful autonomy. In 
Panel presentation at CCW Informal meeting of experts on lethal 
autonomous weapons, Geneva, April 12, 2016.
Tamburrini, G. (2016). On banning autonomous weapons systems: 
From deontological to wide consequentialist reasons. In N. Bhuta 
et al. (Eds), Autonomous weapons systems: Law, ethics, policy 
(pp. 121–141). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ulgen, O. (2016). Human dignity in an age of autonomous weap-
ons: Are we in danger of losing an ‘elementary consideration 
of humanity’? 8(9). In ESIL conference paper series, 1–19. 
European Society of International Law (ESIL) 2016 annual con-
ference (Riga). Published on January 31, 2017, ESIL SSRN.
UNIDIR. (2015). The weaponization of increasingly autonomous 
technologies: Considering ethics and social values. UNIDIR 
Responses 3.
Vallor, S. (2011). Carebots and caregivers: Sustaining the ethical ideal 
of care in the 21st century. Philosophy & Technology, 24(3), 
251–268.
Waldron, J. (2009). Dignity, rank and rights. Tanner Lectures, UC 
Berkeley.
Werner, M. (2014). Individual and collective dignity. In M. Düwell, 
J. Braarvig, R. Brownsword & D. Mieth (Eds.), The Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity: Interdisciplinary perspectives 
(pp. 343–352). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https ://
doi.org/10.1017/CBO97 80511 97903 3.040.
